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Goodwill Impairment as a Tool for 
Earnings Management 
 
 
Jamilla Lemans1 
 
 
Executive summary2 
This research examines whether or not goodwill impairments are being used by Dutch 
listed firms to manipulate earnings. Two different regression models are used for this 
purpose which include firm-specific factors as well as proxies for big bath accounting, 
income smoothing and a factor for measuring the recognition of higher impairments around 
the time of a CEO change. The results show that the method (model) chosen to measure 
the impairment decision influences the generated results, and that overall no strong 
evidence is found which indicates that goodwill impairments are indeed being used to 
manipulate earnings. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5375. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This research examines whether or not the impairment of goodwill is used to manipulate 
earnings at Dutch listed firms in the period 2005-2008. Since the introduction of the 
standards IFRS 3 and IAS 36, more professional judgement is needed for the valuation of 
goodwill in the financial statements, thereby bringing a higher level of subjectivity. This 
subjectivity provides opportunities for management to manipulate earnings, which can 
cause a distorting image in the financial statements which are provided to its users. When 
considering this subjectivity in the light of the current credit crisis, it becomes clear that 
this is a hot topic. The goal of this research is to investigate the significance of 
management’s influence on the value of goodwill which is being accounted for when 
applying an impairment test. This leads to the following overall research question: 
 
Are goodwill impairments being used by management as a tool for earnings management? 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First some important prior research 
on earnings management and goodwill is discussed (Section 2). Next, the hypotheses are 
presented as well as the models which are being applied in this research. Section 4 then 
presents the main results as well as the analysis. The paper concludes with a short 
                                             
1 Jamilla Lemans studied Economics and Business at the Erasmus University and is currently working as an 
auditor at Ernst & Young Accountants LLP. This study has been supervised by ms. Dr. Y. Wang. 
2 For a more elaborate discussion of earnings management and goodwill (impairment), as well as a more 
elaborate discussion of empirical evidence from prior literature and more detailed results of the empirical part 
of this research, a reference is made to the full text version of the master thesis.  
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summary and conclusion, the limitations of this research as well as some suggestions for 
future research on this topic in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Prior literature 
This section will discuss prior literature regarding earnings management, the implications 
of applying the impairment test for goodwill, as well as how the impairment test can be 
used as a tool for earnings management. 
 
2.1 Earnings management 
In the literature many different insights with regard to defining earnings management 
exist. A definition that is used often and will be used in this research is the definition from 
Schipper (1989, pp. 92): “Disclosure management, in the sense of a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some 
private gains (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process”. This definition implies that management intervenes in the reporting process to 
reach some sort of personal gains. Also it does not classify earnings management as fraud. 
Therefore this definition captures the most import aspects of earnings management and 
fits this research in a good manner. 
 
In practice, also different types of earnings management can be distinguished. The two 
most important types for this research are big bath accounting and income smoothing. Big 
bath accounting is an example of the use of earnings management to decrease the earnings 
of a firm. As many as possible, losses and write-offs are incurred in the same year. 
According to Mohanram (2003, pp. 2), big bath accounting is used by firms which cannot 
achieve their targets in a year. When these firms miss their targets, they engage in 
accounting methods to make the firm’s results even worse. Two reasons for this can be 
identified. First it is very unlikely that the firm can reach the targets set for that year, 
implying the year is ‘lost’. Secondly, the costs arising from missing the targets are incurred 
anyway. The costs the firm will incur from performing even worse will be minimal, since 
the biggest damage is done by missing the targets. The additional incurred losses can be 
used to increase or smooth income in future years.  
Income smoothing on the other hand is used by management if they want to present a 
consecutive line of increasing earnings. To achieve this, earnings management that both 
increases and decreases income can be used. If the firm’s income is higher than targeted, 
income can be decreased by using earnings management. As Mohanram (2003, pp. 3) points 
out, two purposes for this kind of accounting can be identified. The first is to ‘save’ some 
income for the future when the firm may not be able to meet its targets. The earnings 
from the previous period are used later. Earnings management can then be considered ‘as 
an intertemporal transfer of income between periods’ (Mohanram, 2003, pp. 6). The 
second purpose of decreasing income, if income is higher than targeted, is to prevent 
expectations about the firm’s performance to rise. If the expectations about future 
earnings increase, future targets will be more difficult to reach. Consequently, the 
consecutive line of increased earnings can be ended, as a result of one exceptionally good 
result. 
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2.2 The goodwill impairment test 
The issuance of the new standard IFRS 3 requires that goodwill will be impaired annually 
based on fair value estimates of the acquired business. The impairment test replaces the 
annual depreciation of goodwill that was used previously. 
According to IFRS 3, it is necessary to recognize an impairment loss when there is a 
decrease in value. An impairment loss is defined as ‘the amount by which the carrying 
amount of an asset or a cash generating unit exceeds its recoverable amount’ (IAS 36.6). 
 
An implication of applying the impairment test in practice is that a large amount of factors 
need to be determined for the impairment calculation, including the recoverable amount, 
the value in use, the carrying amount and the fair value. For instance regarding fair value, 
it is important that entities, who are estimating expected future cash flows, rely on 
reasonable and supportable assumptions and projections, according to Lander and 
Reinstein (2003, pp. 228). Also they should consider all available evidence to estimate 
these cash flows, since this forms the basis of the impairment test. The weight given to 
such evidence should be commensurate with how well the entity can verify this evidence 
objectively. Entities using ranges to estimate the amount or timing of possible cash flows 
should consider the likelihood of possible outcomes either directly, when applying an 
expected cash flow approach, or indirectly through the risk-adjusted discount rate, when 
determining the best estimate of future cash flows. 
However, the factors used in an impairment test depend on a lot of assumptions made by 
management, since management is responsible for preparing the initial impairment 
calculation. The auditor only has the obligation to check this calculation. Some examples 
of assumptions that need to be made in the calculation include the discount factor (the 
weighted average cost of capital can be used for this), the amounts of future cash flows 
and the growth factor of the future cash flows. These assumptions give rise to a relatively 
high level of subjectivity in the impairment test. This level of subjectivity is supported by 
literature of Kuipers and Boissevain (2005). They argue that the most important 
opportunities to manage earnings are present in the area of cash flow projections. 
Therefore the underlying assumptions need to be challenged, amongst others internally 
and by the auditor, to test whether these assumptions are realistic. The existence of this 
higher level of subjectivity is also supported by Ball (2006) and Bini and Bella (2007). 
However, challenging the assumptions may be quite difficult to accomplish in practice. 
Johnson (2007) expresses concerns about auditors who may lack the necessary training in 
valuation methods for estimating fair values. This raises serious questions regarding the 
implementation of the fair value principle (and impairment) in practice. 
Ball (2006) provides a possible reason for management to use impairments as a tool to 
manage earnings. Management fears to be punished by the market in the case of 
impairment shortly after an acquisition. The market may see this impairment as a sign of 
mismanagement, because the firm has likely overpaid for the acquired business. This 
reasoning is also supported by empirical evidence found by Li et al. (2005). 
 
2.3 Managing goodwill impairments 
This section will discuss the link between earnings management and the impairment of 
goodwill based on a summary of the most important prior research done on this subject. A 
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distinction is made between different kinds of research that give other insights into this 
subject. 
 
Zucca and Campbell (1992) performed empirical research to test the link between earnings 
management and goodwill impairments. They assume that there is no pattern in the path 
of expected earnings, indicating that the path is ‘random’. Zucca and Campbell (1992) 
found that the majority (45 out of 77) of the write-downs investigated were recorded when 
earnings were below expected earnings (“bathers”), while 22 out of 77 were recorded 
when earnings exceeded expectations (“income smoothers”). They interpreted these 
results as evidence that write-downs are used to manage earnings. 
Van de Poel et al. (2008) recently studied a sample of listed companies in 15 EU countries 
preparing financial statements under IFRS in the period 2005-2006. They find, based on 
regression analysis, that the goodwill impairment decision for these companies is highly 
associated with financial reporting incentives. More specifically, their findings support that 
companies typically take their impairments when earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high 
(smoothing) or when they are ‘unexpectedly’ low (big bath accounting). This evidence is 
therefore in accordance with the results of the research of Zucca and Campbell (1992). 
Research was performed by Alciatore et al. (1998) on the finding that the discretion 
inherent in GAAP pertaining to asset impairments could be used by firms in their self-
interest. An example they provide is that firms may use GAAP flexibility to avoid taking 
impairments due to concerns about potentially negative stock market reactions to such 
charges. Other firms could however record an impairment loss when earnings are 
particularly high in order to smooth income or, alternatively, they could take a bath by 
accelerating an impairment when earnings are already poor to maximize profits in future 
periods. Alciatore et al. (1998) argue that this flexibility suggests that the impairment 
decision could be strategically used by managers to adjust the timing and amounts of 
charges to income. 
In addition, Jordan and Clark (2004) also found evidence which indicated that companies 
with unusually low earnings in a year reported a large impairment loss in order to lower 
the reported earnings even further, which is indicative of big bath accounting. Empirical 
evidence consistent with this behaviour is found by Francis et al. (1996). They show that 
managers use two different sorts of determinants in the asset impairment decision. On the 
one hand, managers take into account factors which reflect declines in the values of assets 
due to poor firm performance, increased competition and changes in the economic 
climate. On the other hand, asset impairment decisions may be influenced by personal 
reporting incentives, which means that management may take advantage of the discretion 
afforded by accounting rules to manipulate earnings by either not recognizing impairments 
when this is needed, or by recognizing impairments only when it is advantageous for 
management to do so. Francis et al. (1996, pp. 134) use a weighted tobit model to 
estimate the importance of impairments and earnings management variables in explaining 
both the existence and amount of a firm’s write-off decisions. They find that for the full 
sample of write-offs, both manipulation and impairment are important determinants, but 
that incentives play a substantial role in explaining such items as goodwill write-offs. 
Sevin and Schroeder (2005) also conducted research concerning goodwill impairments but 
focused more on the size of the firm as a factor that could influence the impairment. They 
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found that smaller firms were more negatively impacted by SFAS 142 and were therefore 
more likely to impair goodwill than larger firms. They therefore argued that goodwill 
seemed to be an account that lends itself to some level of manipulation and that the firm 
size and the level of earnings appear to be a factor in determining the impairment. 
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine several potentially important economic incentives that 
firms face when making impairment decisions. In using a regression model, which is 
consistent with previously discussed research by Van de Poel et al. (2008), they find 
evidence suggesting that firms’ equity market concerns affect their preference for ‘above-
the-line’ versus ‘below-the-line’ accounting treatment, and firms’ debt contracting, 
bonus, turnover, and exchange delisting incentives affect their decisions to accelerate or 
delay expense recognition. However, Bens (2006) questioned the regression model used by 
Beatty and Weber (2006, pp. 296). He argued that accounting decisions can be quite 
complex, and such a simple linear framework (many dummy variables are incorporated in 
the model) may not capture many of the interesting subtleties involved. Moreover, many 
of the proxy variables used in the Beatty and Weber framework were difficult to interpret 
unambiguously. This criticism indicates that the regression model used by Beatty and 
Weber (2006), but herewith also the model used by Van de Poel et al. (2008), should be 
adjusted to capture more of the complexity of accounting (impairment) decisions. 
Henning et al. (2004, pp. 119) used a research method consistent with research discussed 
previously by Van de Poel et al. (2008) and Beatty and Weber (2006). Regarding the 
amount of goodwill write-offs, their results indicate that “U.S. firm goodwill write-offs 
and U.K. firm goodwill revaluations exceed the amounts predicted by our models when we 
consider the initial value of goodwill. However, the actual write-offs and revaluations do 
not differ from amounts predicted by our models when we consider changes in the value 
of goodwill after the acquisition”. The authors find this interesting, since this kind of 
valuation behaviour is consistent with the big bath findings of Elliott and Shaw (1988). The 
results of Henning et al. (2004, pp. 114) may therefore reflect managerial incentives to 
maximize the goodwill impairment in transition, especially since the impairment was 
shown as a non-operating loss in the year of the adoption of SFAS 142, but as an operating 
expense in subsequent years. According to Henning et al. (2004, p. 119), it appears that 
“U.S. firms delayed the income-reducing effects of goodwill write-offs, and U.K. firms 
timed the asset-increasing effects of goodwill revaluations to avoid additional agency 
costs”. These findings indicate that a certain amount of influence was used in determining 
the timing of the impairment decision, because a different timing of the impairment (and 
revaluation) could have had a major influence on the presented income in the financial 
statements. 
 
Another direction of research supporting the link between earnings management and 
goodwill impairments was performed by Masters-Stout et al. (2007, pp. 2). In their 
research they incorporate the change in CEO as a variable which could influence the 
impairment decision. They hypothesize that CEOs tend to manipulate the impairment in 
the early years of their tenure since blame can be placed on earlier management’s 
acquisition decisions and expensing goodwill early can improve future earnings. If new 
CEOs impair more goodwill than their senior counterparts, it would indicate that the 
impairment rules are not being applied consistently. In their research they also use a 
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regression model, as previously seen with Van de Poel et al. (2008), Beatty and Weber 
(2006) and Henning et al. (2004). The results of the analysis (Masters-Stout et al., 2007, 
pp. 13) provide compelling evidence that new CEOs impair more goodwill than their senior 
counterparts. Also a relationship exists between net income and the amount of impairment 
for all CEOs. These results therefore indicate that the new impairment rules, at a 
minimum, are applied differently between new and senior CEOs. 
Strong and Meyer (1987, pp. 643) also performed research regarding CEO changes and 
goodwill impairments. They used multiple discriminant analysis to investigate the 
determinants of goodwill. In using this method, they determined that the change in senior 
management was a significant variable in explaining the tendency to report asset 
impairments. If the new executive came from outside the firm, this effect was even more 
significant. 
The results of the research by Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008)3 provide additional evidence 
for the conclusion that impairments are reported in the case of a CEO change. They use a 
multivariate tobit model to assess the determinants of transitional goodwill impairment 
losses, which is in accordance with the method used by Francis et al. (1996) as discussed 
earlier. Overall, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008, pp. 43) find that the adoption of the 
impairment approach effectively triggered the recognition of large impairment losses for 
Canadian firms. An association is shown between the magnitude of transitional goodwill 
impairment losses and firms’ incentives to both overstate and understate them. The results 
(Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008, pp. 51) suggest that firms record higher transitional 
goodwill impairment losses to minimize the deviation from the industry median ROE 
(return on equity) and ROA (return on assets) as well as when they experience a change in 
CEO. The results are also consistent with firms recording lower transitional impairment 
losses to avoid further deviation from the industry median leverage, when there are 
sizable unrealized gains on exercisable stock options, when they subsequently issue new 
debt or equity capital, and when they are cross-listed in the United States. Finally, their 
findings seem to indicate that financially literate and independent audit committee 
members constrain managerial opportunism with respect to transitional goodwill 
impairment losses.  
 
 
3. Hypothesis development, model development and sample selection 
 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
Based on the discussion of empirical evidence about the link between earnings 
management and goodwill impairments, it is possible to develop multiple hypotheses. 
 
The first hypothesis can be linked back to the discussion of big bath accounting. When 
earnings are unexpectedly low and therefore the overall performance of the firm is below 
the desirable level, management will be more likely to choose for the recognition of an 
                                             
3 Noticeable for this research is that Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) divided the total sample into industry 
groups (energy, materials, industrial, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, 
information technology, telecommunications and utilities), according to TSX Indices, as given by Compustat. 
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impairment loss since the performance is already low. Therefore they ‘take a bath’ by 
recognizing a high goodwill impairment loss. This will provide management with the 
opportunity to increase or at least improve earnings in future years, since then the 
recognition of an impairment loss will probably not be necessary. This can also be linked 
to the bonus plan hypothesis which is also an important aspect of earnings management. 
Managers are unable to reach their bonus in a year of poor firm performance and 
therefore they take a bath to improve the chance of reaching the bonus in future years.  
 
Based on the theory of big bath accounting, the following hypothesis is developed:  
 
H1: Firms are more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ low, ceteris paribus. 
 
To test this hypothesis, a proxy for the use of big bath accounting will be incorporated in 
the model. In this research the variable BATHit (and BATH2it) will be used for this purpose. 
This variable is used to determine whether the earnings (before taxes) of the firm are 
below the industry median. When this is the case, management has an incentive to engage 
in earnings management by taking a bath. How this variable is measured is discussed into 
more detail in Appendix I. It is expected that a positive relation will be found between 
this variable and the impairment decision, since low earnings indicate poor performance 
and therefore an impairment loss may need to be recognized. Based on the latter, it is 
expected that the hypothesis will hold when tested by the model which is developed for 
this research. 
 
The reasoning for the development of the second hypothesis is based on earnings 
management in the form of income smoothing. Under the circumstances that earnings are 
‘unexpectedly’ high and the performance of the firm does not influence the bonus level 
anymore, management will have an incentive to recognize a goodwill impairment loss. 
This choice can be based on the fact that earnings are so high that the ceiling of the 
manager’s bonus has already been reached. In that case, it is more profitable for 
management to accelerate the impairment since accelerating goodwill impairments has a 
positive effect on the chance of reaching the bonus in future years. Also this choice can 
be based on the fact that management wants to present a consecutive line of increasing 
earnings. When impairments need to be accounted for, this could have a great influence 
on this consecutive line of earnings, depending of course on the absolute size of the 
impairment. Therefore management may have incentives to postpone the impairment loss 
and to pass the impairment on to the future in the case of poor performance. However, 
when looking at the case when earnings are unexpectedly high, these earnings can then 
be smoothed by recognizing an impairment loss that may not have been necessary yet to 
boost performance in the future. Therefore, this hypothesis can be seen from two 
different viewpoints. The first viewpoint is based on the bonus plan hypothesis, the 
second is based on the incentive to smooth earnings. 
Based on the previously discussed theory the following hypothesis can be formulated. 
 
H2: Firms are more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high, ceteris paribus. 
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As also discussed with the first hypothesis, for this hypothesis also a proxy needs to be 
determined which can measure whether income smoothing takes place. For this purpose 
the variable SMOOTHit (and SMOOTH2it) will be incorporated in the model (see Appendix I 
for a more precise measurement of this variable). This variable is used to determine 
whether the firm’s earnings deviate (substantially) upward from the industry median. 
When this is the case, an indication is found that management has an incentive to smooth 
earnings. It is expected that a positive relation will be found between this variable and the 
impairment decision, since the unexpected good performance of a firm provides the 
incentive to smooth earnings and therefore to report an impairment loss. 
Based on the latter, it is expected that this hypothesis will hold when tested by the model. 
 
Overall, Hypothesis 1 and 2 imply that it is expected that managers are encouraged to 
underreport earnings in the case of large earnings surprises. In that case, firms have 
incentives to report all impairments and even accelerate impairments to boost 
performance in the future (see also Van de Poel et al., 2008, pp. 15). 
 
The effects of a change in CEO are also included in this research, since the discussed 
evidence in the previous section has shown that a change in CEO can result in big bath 
accounting. Important research discussed on this topic was done by Masters-Stout et al. 
(2007). They found compelling evidence that new CEOs impair more goodwill than their 
senior counterparts. Also Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) found higher transitional goodwill 
impairment losses when a firm experienced a CEO change. The reasoning behind this is 
that new CEOs will try to loose the inheritance of the previous CEO to make sure that the 
performance in the following years will improve. So the new CEO will try to pass the weak 
performance onto its predecessor. As discussed with the first hypothesis, the new CEO will 
therefore ‘take a bath’ to loose this entire inheritance immediately in the first year. 
Based on the previously discussed theory it is therefore also hypothesized that: 
 
H3: Firms that experience a change in CEO record higher transitional 
goodwill impairment losses. 
 
To test this hypothesis, a proxy is incorporated in the model only now for measuring higher 
impairments around the time of a CEO change. The variable CEOit will be used for this 
purpose which is based on a combination of the models of Masters-Stout et al. (2007, pp. 
6) and Francis et al. (1996, pp. 122-124). The results of research done by Masters-Stout et 
al. (2007, pp. 11-12) and Francis et al. (1996, pp. 125) have proven that, as expected, this 
variable has a significant impact on the impairment decision. Since a change in CEO is 
often associated with big bath accounting, it is therefore expected that a positive relation 
will be found between this variable and the impairment decision. 
Based on the theory and the outcomes of these studies, it is therefore expected that this 
relation between CEO changes and the recognition of goodwill impairment losses can be 
found in this empirical research, which implies that it is expected that Hypothesis 3 will 
hold when being tested by the model 
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3.2 Model development 
In the brief literature review, multiple models have been mentioned that were used to 
perform empirical research on goodwill impairments and earnings management. The choice 
was made to use the model of Van de Poel et al. (2008) as the starting point for this 
research, and from thereon make adjustments to fit the model to the purposes of this 
research. The model of Van de Poel et al. (2008) is the most appropriate model to use as a 
starting point for this research since it incorporates many different factors, including 
reporting incentives and economic conditions of the firm. Also the variables are measured 
such that the magnitude of the figures is also taken into account in a large number of cases 
when investigating the impairment decision. 
The following two adjusted models are developed for this research.4  
 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Sample selection 
The focus of this research will be on all Dutch listed companies in the period 2005-2008. 
This implies that the total initial sample consists of 1.529 firm-year observations as 
gathered through the Thomson One Banker financial databases from Worldscope 
Fundamentals. Noticeable is that the year 2008 has also been included as far as is known 
at this very moment5.  
 
                                             
4 The precise measurement of the variables is incorporated in Appendix I and will not be discussed here into 
further detail. For the reasoning behind the choice of these different variables as well as the choice for the 
method of measuring the variables, a reference is again made to the full text version of the thesis. 
5Date of sample selection is March 17th 2009. 
IMPAIRMENTit = α0 + α1 BATHit + α2 SMOOTHit + α3 CEOit  
+ α4 ΔSALESit + α5 ΔOCFit + α6 ΔindROAit   
+ α7 GOODWILLit-1 + α8 SIZEit  + α9 INDUSTRYit + εit 
IMPAIR_AMOUNTit = α0 + α1 BATH2it + α2 SMOOTH2it + α3 CEOit
+ α4 ΔSALESit + α5 ΔOCFit + α6 ΔindROAit   
+ α7 GOODWILLit-1 + α8 SIZEit  + α9 INDUSTRYit + εit 
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Table 1: Goodwill impairment losses by industry (excl. Financials) 
 
Number of firm-year observations  
Industry group Total % of total Impairment % of total 
0001 Oil and Gas 17 4.63% 5 29.41% 
1000 Basic materials 11 3.00% 5 45.45% 
2000 Industrials 134 36.51% 29 21.64% 
3000 Consumer goods 55 14.99% 12 21.82% 
4000 Health care  23 6.27% 1 4.35% 
5000 Consumer services 63 17.17% 13 20.63% 
6700 Other  7 1.91% 3 42.86% 
9000 Technology  57 15.53% 11 19.30% 
 Total 367 100.01%6 79 21.53% 
 
 
The initial sample is adapted to the research setting. This is done by excluding those 
observations which concern inactive firms, as well as observations for which not all data is 
available (especially for the year 2008). In addition, also those observations have been 
excluded in which no goodwill opening balance is present and simultaneously no 
impairment is recorded since these observations do not relate to goodwill and/or 
impairments and therefore do not have any additional value for this research. After this 
process of elimination the sample consists of 393 firm-year observations, split up into the 
different industries, as depicted in Table 1. 
Important to notice is that financials have been excluded since such firms have to deal 
with very different laws and regulations than firms in other industries and may therefore 
cause a distortion in the results. The final sample therefore consists of 367 observations. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
This section will present the results of the performed empirical research, as well as an 
analysis of the results. In the first subsection, the results for the total sample are 
presented for both models. The second subsection briefly presents the results for the 
alternative tests. 
 
Noticeable is that five different versions of the two models have been used in the 
regression analysis to determine whether any significant changes occur when a particular 
variable is excluded. Version I is the full model as depicted in section 3.2. The versions II, 
III and IV each exclude (one of) the variables that were incorporated to test the 
hypotheses. This is done to test whether these variables have additional explanatory power 
and whether excluding these variables can lead to changes in the results concerning the 
regression coefficients. The choice is made to exclude the variables in the following order. 
Version II first excludes the variable CEOit since this variable is not one of the types of 
earnings management as distinguished by the theory. The next variable that is excluded for 
                                             
6 The total percentage differs from 100% as a consequence of rounding-off the percentages for each industry. 
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version III is BATHit, since big bath accounting may be easier to detect than income 
smoothing and may therefore be used less often by management to avoid a loss of 
prestige. Therefore, version IV excludes the variable SMOOTHit. Version V is the last 
version that is applied and is composed of the full model (version I), but includes also the 
interaction term between big bath accounting and a CEO change, since this is a factor 
which is added to the model instead of removed like was done for the previous versions, 
since it is expected that this will have additional explanatory power. 
 
4.1 Regression results 
This section presents the regression results for both models. Noticeable is that the focus 
here is on the most important variables in the model, which are used to test the 
hypotheses. The results for the remaining variables are only depicted in Table 2 and 3 and 
will not be discussed into further detail in this paper. 
 
4.1.1  Regression results Model 1 
For Model 1, the conclusion is drawn that the explanatory power of the model (Adjusted R-
square) is not high, namely 0.093 at a maximum for version III of the model (1-III), 
indicating that this is the optimal version of the model. Noticeable is that Model 1-III is not 
the full model or the full model with as an additional variable the interaction term 
between big bath accounting and a CEO change. This implies that the models 1-I and 1-V 
have less explanatory power than the model that does not include the variable BATHit and 
the interaction term. This implies that these factors do not have additional explanatory 
power and can best be left out of the model. This result contradicts with expectations, 
since it was expected that the full model (including the interaction term) would have the 
highest explanatory power. In addition, the regression part of the Sum of Squares is 
particularly low, confirming the low explanatory power. The conclusion can therefore be 
drawn that Model 1 does not predict the impairment decision accurately and that a large 
residual is presented which cannot be explained by the regression. 
 
Table 2 shows that the economic factor ΔOCFit, the reporting incentive SMOOTHit and the 
control variable SIZEit are factors that have a significant influence on the impairment 
decision (IMPAIRMENTit) for all versions of Model 1. For the model versions I, II and III the 
significance levels at which these factors prove to have a significant influence are also 
similar. However, the significance level that is applicable in the case of the economic 
factor ΔOCFit for versions IV and V is somewhat different (1% and 10% respectively instead 
of 5%), but the factor still has a significant influence. 
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Table 2: Regression results Model 1 (total sample) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
(Constant) 
-0.246 
(0.003)*** 
-0.245 
(0.002)*** 
-0.236 
(0.002)*** 
-0.175 
(0.014)** 
-0.247 
(0.003)*** 
 
ΔindROAit 
0.005 
(0.395) 
0.005 
(0.395) 
0.005 
(0.379) 
0.004 
(0.473) 
0.005 
(0.397) 
 
ΔSALESit 
0.057 
(0.328) 
0.057 
(0.324) 
0.056 
(0.330) 
0.065 
(0.261) 
0.056 
(0.333) 
 
ΔOCFit 
-0.440 
(0.030)** 
-0.443 
(0.028)** 
-0.476 
(0.009)*** 
-0.314 
(0.056)* 
-0.439 
(0.032)** 
 
BATHit 
0.027 
(0.691) 
0.027 
(0.690) 
  0.025 
(0.734) 
 
SMOOTHit 
0.108 
(0.047)** 
0.108 
(0.044)** 
0.106 
(0.047)** 
 0.108 
(0.047)** 
 
CEOit 
-0.008 
(0.868) 
   0.007 
(0.898) 
 
GOODWILLit 
0.066 
(0.655) 
0.067 
(0.652) 
0.067 
(0.648) 
0.054 
(0.715) 
0.066 
(0.656) 
 
SIZEit 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
0.064 
(0.000)*** 
0.059 
(0.000)*** 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
 
BATHit*CEOit 
    0.008 
(0.951) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
 
When examining the effects of the variables of interest on the impairment decision into 
more detail, the conclusion can be drawn that the reporting incentive SMOOTHit has a 
positive significant influence on the impairment decision, which is consistent with 
expectations and prior research (Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Van de Poel et al., 2008). This 
indicates that high earnings and therefore high performance lead to a higher reported 
impairment loss, which is a proxy for the use of income smoothing. This implies that firms 
use impairments as a tool for earnings management in the form of income smoothing to 
present a consecutive line of increasing earnings. Therefore this provides evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 2 that firms are more likely to report a goodwill impairment loss 
when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ high. 
One variable that does not prove to have a significant influence on the impairment 
decision is the reporting incentive BATHit. This result contradicts with the results of Zucca 
and Campbell (1992) and Van de Poel et al. (2008), since they found evidence that this 
factor does have a significant effect on the impairment decision. Since this effect was 
supported by the theory concerning big bath accounting, it is remarkable that the results 
show no significant effect. Noticeable is that the model which has the highest explanatory 
power does not include this variable, indicating that it does not have additional 
explanatory power when incorporated in a model with the other variables. One possible 
reason why this variable has no significant effect is that management does not use the 
discretion provided by IFRS to report large impairment losses when performance is poor, 
based on economic considerations for the firm as a whole or with regard to private gains. It 
is possible that management is afraid it needs to step down when performance is even 
lower. Also it is possible that management can still earn a bonus at the current 
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performance level which would be lost when an impairment loss is reported. Many 
considerations can therefore lead to the same decision not to report an impairment. These 
results however indicate that big bath accounting is not used by management, which 
implies that no evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 1, stating that firms are more 
likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are unexpectedly low. 
Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected based on this evidence. 
Another variable that does not have a significant effect on the impairment decision is 
CEOit. Again it is remarkable that no significant relation is found, since this result is 
inconsistent with expectations as well as with the results of the research performed by 
Masters-Stout et al. (2007), Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) and Strong and Meyer (1987) 
which indicated that a significant positive relation should have been found. Since the 
effect on the impairment decision is not significant, this variable does not prove that more 
or higher impairments are being reported around the time of a CEO change. This therefore 
implies that no evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 3, which should therefore be 
rejected. A possible reason why this effect does not prove to be significant is that also the 
variable associated with big bath accounting is not significant, indicating that less use is 
being made of this method. Another reason is that not in many cases when a CEO change 
has taken place, an impairment loss is being reported. Perhaps the performance of the 
company has not been such at the time of the change that an impairment loss could have 
been justified. Therefore the impairment could not have been passed onto the previous 
CEO since then suspicion would have been raised, which implies that it is in the best 
interest of the CEO not to report an impairment loss. 
 
4.1.2  Regression results Model 2 
For Model 2, the Adjusted R-square is at a maximum of 0.566 for version V of the model (2-
V). The explanatory power of this model is therefore quite high. Noticeable is that this 
concerns the full model which incorporates all variables as well as the interaction term, 
indicating that together these variables can best predict the impairment decision. In 
addition, the regression for Model 2-V explains the largest part of the Sum of Squares, 
which leads to a smaller residual. This confirms that the explanatory power is quite high. 
 
The estimates of the regression coefficients for Model 2 are depicted in Table 3. The 
results show that the economic factors ΔSALESit and ΔOCFit, the reporting incentives 
BATH2it and SMOOTH2it, the control variable GOODWILLit and the interaction term 
BATH2it*CEOit all have a significant influence on the impairment decision 
(IMPAIR_AMOUNTit) for all versions of the model, except the interaction term which is only 
incorporated in model version V. For all these variables the significance levels are also the 
same for all versions of the model, except for ΔSALESit (5% level, with exception of version 
III where the 1% level is applicable). 
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Table 3: Regression results Model 2 (total sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
 
When examining the variables of interest into more detail, the conclusion can be drawn 
that the variable BATH2it has a significant influence, however with a negative sign. This 
result contradicts expectations and prior research (Francis et al., 1996; Van de Poel et al., 
2008), since it was expected that low earnings would lead to the recognition of an 
impairment loss. Evidence now is found indicating that firms experiencing ‘unexpectedly’ 
low earnings are more likely not to report an impairment loss. This effect can be caused by 
the relative magnitude of the change in earnings. Perhaps the level of earnings for a firm 
were not substantially low from the view of management, therefore leading to the delay of 
an impairment. The choice not to record an impairment loss can then possibly be based on 
the idea that the lower performance is only temporarily and therefore no impairment is 
necessary. This can therefore account for the different sign for this variable, since low 
performance in this case is not associated with goodwill impairments. Based on theory this 
can also be explained as a form of loss minimalisation. So this method is different than big 
bath accounting, since that method can also be associated with loss maximalisation. This 
result implies that no evidence is found supporting Hypothesis 1, stating that firms are 
more likely to report a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are ‘unexpectedly’ 
low. Therefore this hypothesis needs to be rejected based on the different sign of the 
effect, even though the effect is significant. 
The variable SMOOTH2it also has a negative significant influence on the impairment 
decision for the model versions I, II and V, but a positive sign for model version III. This 
positive sign is as expected, since a high performance and therefore high earnings can be 
smoothed by recognizing an impairment loss. This result is also consistent with the 
research of Francis et al. (1996). However, the negative sign for this variable when the 
other model versions are applied contradicts expectations. This can be explained by the 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
(Constant) -0.017 
(0.007)*** 
-0.017 
(0.009)*** 
-0.009 
(0.216) 
0.008 
(0.222) 
-0.010 
(0.058)* 
ΔindROAit 0.000 
(0.259) 
0.000 
(0.268) 
0.000 
(0.632) 
0.000 
(0.562) 
0.000 
(0.580) 
ΔSALESit 0.010 
(0.019)** 
0.011 
(0.015)** 
0.013 
(0.009)*** 
0.011 
(0.034)** 
0.008 
(0.040)** 
ΔOCFit 0.176 
(0.000)*** 
0.173 
(0.000)*** 
-0.158 
(0.000)*** 
-0.102 
(0.000)*** 
0.190 
(0.000)*** 
BATH2it -0.421 
(0.000)*** 
-0.422 
(0.000)*** 
  -0.245 
(0.000)*** 
SMOOTH2it -0.119 
(0.002)*** 
-0.113 
(0.003)*** 
0.148 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.142 
(0.000)*** 
CEOit 0.005 
(0.127) 
   -0.004 
(0.164) 
GOODWILLit 0.038 
(0.001)*** 
0.038 
(0.001)*** 
0.043 
(0.001)*** 
0.048 
(0.000)*** 
0.029 
(0.002)*** 
SIZEit 0.001 
(0.306) 
0.001 
(0.248) 
0.000 
(0.819) 
-0.002 
(0.071)* 
0.001 
(0.267) 
BATH2it*CEOit     -0.325 
(0.000)*** 
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reasoning that earnings are not high enough to record an impairment loss. One possible 
reason for this can be that management cannot reach the maximum bonus when an 
impairment is recognized. Also it is possible that the recognition of an impairment can 
negatively affect the presentation of a consecutive line of increasing earnings. These 
results indicate that for model version III this variable is a proxy for the use of income 
smoothing, which implies that evidence is found that goodwill impairments are indeed 
being used as a tool for earnings management in the form of income smoothing. Therefore, 
for this model version, evidence is found that supports Hypothesis 2, indicating that firms 
are more likely to record a goodwill impairment loss when their earnings are 
‘unexpectedly’ high. However, for the other model versions (I, II and V) the results 
indicate that the variable is not a proxy for income smoothing or profit minimalisation, but 
instead a proxy for profit maximalisation since no impairment loss is being recognized. This 
implies that for these model versions evidence is found which is not in support of 
Hypothesis 2. Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected. 
For the interaction term BATH2it*CEOit the sign is negative, which contradicts with the 
individual expectations for these two variables since for both variables a positive relation 
was expected. This result also contradicts with the individual results in prior research 
(Francis et al., 1996 for BATH2it; Masters-Stout et al., 2007 for CEOit). taking into account 
that no prior research incorporated an interaction term for the combined effect of these 
factors. A possible explanation for the negative sign for this interaction term can be based 
on the result for the proxy for big bath accounting. The sign of the variable BATH2it is 
negative. When the sign for the variable CEOit is positive, together these variables lead to 
a negative sign for the interaction term. In that case the sign for the variable CEOit is as 
expected. Since the interaction term is significant and negative, a CEO change is not 
associated with big bath accounting but more with loss minimalisation. In other words, 
around the time of a CEO change, loss minimalisation is applied instead of big bath 
accounting and therefore the new CEO does not pass a weak performance onto his 
predecessor to loose the inheritance. Evidence is therefore found which contradicts with 
Hypothesis 3, indicating that firms which experience a change in CEO record higher 
goodwill impairment losses. Therefore this hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
4.2 Results alternative tests 
When comparing the results from the two models, it is a remarkable finding that the 
results differ significantly, since Van de Poel (2008) has stated that the use of a model 
with a dummy variable as the dependent variable (Model 1) to measure the impairment 
decision does not lead to different results compared to the use of goodwill impairment 
amounts (deflated by total assets) for measuring the dependent variable (Model 2). Since 
the results differ substantially after applying the two different models, alternative tests 
have been performed. Appendix II depicts the results of these tests for both models. 
 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from these tests are as follows. For Model 1 (see 
Tabel 4, Appendix II), the results show that the variable SMOOTHit is the only significant 
variable for the observations from the year 2005, while for all other years none of the 
variables of interest have a significant influence on the impairment decision. This indicates 
that the results are heavily influenced by the observations from 2005, which is the 
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transition year to IFRS. Therefore it can be concluded that income smoothing has only 
been applied in 2005, meaning that Hypothesis 1 only holds for the observations from 2005 
and should be rejected for all other years. The results for the total sample therefore do 
not sustain alternative tests. Based on these results, it seems that the introduction of IFRS 
has provided management the opportunity to manipulate earnings.  
 
The results for Model 2 are depicted in Table 5 (Appendix II). The results show that for the 
years 2005 and 2008 none of the variables have a significant effect on the impairment 
decision. It seems that in 2005 management was awaiting further developments as a 
consequence of the introduction of IFRS and that the credit crisis has influenced 
management’s behaviour in 2008. Observations from 2005 and 2008 therefore cause a 
distortion in the results for the total sample, since they weaken the effects of the 
different reporting incentives on the impairment decision. 
For the observations from 2006 and 2007, the results differ substantially. For 2006 the 
variables BATH2it and SMOOTH2it have a significant effect for the model versions I, II and 
III, but not for version V. Since these reporting incentives do not have a significant effect 
on the impairment decision for version IV, this result contradicts with those for the total 
sample. However, for the other versions of Model 2, the sign of the variable SMOOTH2it is 
positive while it was negative for the total sample. This indicates that for the observations 
in 2006, higher impairments are being recognized in the case of unexpectedly high 
earnings. This implies that income smoothing is being used as a tool for earnings 
management, meaning that evidence is found in support of Hypothesis 2, while previously 
evidence for profit maximalisation was found. Noticeable is that the variable CEOit proves 
to be significantly negative only for version V at the 5% level. This result contradicts the 
result for the total sample, since in that case a positive relation is found for version I 
instead of V. Therefore a CEO change in this case is associated with lower impairments. 
The interaction term is still negative and significant at the 1% level. Therefore the 
conclusions drawn based on the earlier results for this factor are robust. 
For 2007, the reporting incentives BATH2it and SMOOTH2it and the interaction term have a 
significant effect when applying the model versions I, II and V, but not for version IV since 
in that case SMOOTH2it is not significant. The signs and significance levels for these 
variables are similar to those for the total sample. This can therefore lead to the 
conclusion that the conclusions drawn earlier based on these variables sustain after this 
alternative test. For the sample of 2007 also the variable CEOit proves to have a significant 
positive effect at the 1% level for Model 2-I. This contradicts prior results for the total 
sample, since then this variable is not significant. This therefore indicates that in 2007 
more CEO changes occurred simultaneously with the recognition of higher impairment 
losses. Therefore evidence is found that a firm which experiences a change in CEO 
recognizes higher impairments, which is in support of Hypothesis 3. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
In this research it has been investigated whether goodwill impairments are being used as a 
tool to manipulate earnings. Based on the presented results, the conclusion needs to be 
drawn that it depends on the model which is being applied whether this is the case, since 
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the results from the two models differ substantially. After alternative testing, the results 
differ from those for the total sample. For Model 1 earnings management is only found for 
the observations from 2005, so after the introduction of IFRS. For Model 2 (total sample), 
only indications are found that goodwill impairments are being used for profit 
maximalisation and loss minimalisation, instead of income smoothing and big bath 
accounting. Impairments are therefore used in a less extreme manner. After alternative 
testing, the only strong evidence however remains that in 2007 higher goodwill 
impairments have been recorded around the time of a CEO change. For all other 
observations, no (conclusive) evidence is found for earnings management. So overall, the 
results for the total sample are heavily influenced by the transition year to IFRS (2005) and 
the credit crisis (2008) and no strong evidence is found which indicates that management 
indeed uses goodwill impairments to manipulate earnings. 
This research implies that goodwill impairments are highly subjective and therefore it is 
recommended to lower this subjectivity for instance by developing guidelines for 
management to perform the impairment test. More research should be performed on this 
subject to make it possible to include potential guidelines in the standards or to provide 
the standards with more detailed descriptions on how to perform the impairment test. This 
in turn could make it easier for auditors to check the impairment test and may therefore 
lower the subjectivity associated with it. 
 
A limitation of this research is that no results have been generated for each industry 
separately. Since the subsamples for the different industries would have been too small in 
this research, the choice was made not to run the regression for each industry separately 
since it would make the results less reliable. This can however be a good example for 
future research. Also it is possible to look at financials or compare financials to the other 
firms, since financial firms have been excluded from this research because of their 
different laws and regulations with which they need to comply. 
Also it is possible to investigate the effects of the introduction of IFRS on the level of 
earnings management in the Netherlands with regard to goodwill. This could be done by 
examining a certain period before and after the introduction (compare the use of 
amortization with impairments). Also the influence of the revised standard IFRS 3R can be 
investigated in a similar manner, since this new standard allows the use of the full goodwill 
method which can have an impact for the financial statements. 
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Appendix I 
 
Overview of the variables and their definitions 
Dependent variables 
IMPAIRMENTit Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i takes a goodwill 
impairment in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
IMPAIRMENT_ 
AMOUNTit 
The reported impairment amount deflated by total assets at the end of 
year t-1. 
Economic factors 
ΔindROAit The percentage change in firm i‘s industry return on assets (ROA) from 
year t-1 to year t, where industry is defined based on the Industrial 
Classification Benchmark Industry (ICB) from Worldscope. 
ΔSALESit The percentage change in firm i‘s sales from year t-1 to year t (= the 
change in firm i’s sales from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at 
the end of year t-1). 
ΔOCFit The change in firm i‘s operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided 
by total assets at the end of t-1. 
Reporting incentives 
BATHit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in firm i‘s pre-impaired 
earnings (before tax) from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at 
year t-1, is below the industry median of non-zero negative values, and 
0 otherwise (= the proxy for the use of big bath accounting by 
management). 
SMOOTHit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in firm i‘s pre-impaired 
earnings (before tax) from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at 
year t-1, is above the industry median of non-zero positive values, and 
0 otherwise (= the proxy for the use of income smoothing by 
management). 
BATH2it  The value of unexpected earnings when unexpected earnings are below 
zero, and 0 otherwise. Unexpected earnings are measured as the 
operating earnings (earnings before taxes, so net income + income 
taxes) in year t less the operating earnings in year t-1, divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-1. 
SMOOTH2it The value of unexpected earnings less the write-off when this resulting 
amount exceeds zero, and 0 otherwise. Unexpected earnings are 
measured as the operating earnings (earnings before taxes, so net 
income + income taxes) in year t less the operating earnings in year t-1, 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
CEOit Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a change in the 
CEO position in year t-1 or t, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
GOODWILLit The ratio of firm i’s opening balance of goodwill on total assets at t-1. 
SIZEit The natural logarithm of firm i‘s total assets in year t. 
INDUSTRYit Indicator variable that takes the values of the ICB industry codes to 
divide the sample into multiple industry groups. The industry 
distribution is based on the ICB (Industrial Classification Benchmark 
Industry) division. There is a total of 9 industry groups. 
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Appendix II – Regression results alternative tests 
 
 
Table 4: Summary regression results Model 1 – Regression coefficients 
 BATHit SMOOTHit CEOit 
Total sample, 2005-2008 0.027 
(0.691) 
0.108 
(0.047)** 
0.008 
(0.668) 
Total sample, 2005-2006 -0.056 
(0.561) 
0.156 
(0.025)** 
-0.003 
(0.958) 
Total sample, 2007-2008 0.090 
(0.346) 
0.033 
(0.713) 
0.035 
(0.648) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2008 0.004 
(0.954) 
0.107 
(0.060)* 
0.032 
(0.535) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006 -0.073 
(0.497) 
0.146 
(0.041)** 
0.022 
(0.726) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007-2008 0.056 
(0.586) 
0.029 
(0.769) 
0.043 
(0.634) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006-
2007 
-0.024 
(0.769) 
0.094 
(0.112) 
0.041 
(0.452) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005 -0.037 
(0.808) 
0.186 
(0.075)* 
-0.025 
(0.783) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2006 -0.089 
(0.548) 
0.061 
(0.569) 
0.066 
(0.488) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007 0.008 
(0.956) 
-0.031 
(0.778) 
0.072 
(0.505) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2008 -0.042 
(0.842) 
0.084 
(0.728) 
0.056 
(0.779) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
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Table 5: Summary regression results Model 2 – Regression coefficients 
 BATH2it SMOOTH2it CEOit 
Total sample, 2005-2008 -0.421 
(0.000)*** 
-0.119 
(0.002)*** 
0.005 
(0.127) 
Total sample, 2005-2006 -0.263 
(0.000)*** 
0.062 
(0.081)* 
0.000 
(0.998) 
Total sample, 2007-2008 -0.705 
(0.000)*** 
-0.385 
(0.000)*** 
0.014 
(0.023)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2008 -0.440 
(0.000)*** 
-0.139 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.032)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006 -0.264 
(0.000)*** 
0.071 
(0.079)* 
0.001 
(0.870) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007-2008 -0.711 
(0.000)*** 
-0.391 
(0.000)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005-2006-
2007 
-0.461 
(0.000)*** 
-0.152 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.040)** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2005 -0.005 
(0.670) 
0.000 
(0.943) 
0.000 
(0.442) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2006 -0.342 
(0.000)*** 
0.140 
(0.035)** 
-0.007 
(0.183) 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2007 -0.860 
(0.000)*** 
-0.482 
(0.000)*** 
0.028 
(0.004)*** 
Only first-time adopters IFRS, 2008 -0.065 
(0.720) 
0.187 
(0.424) 
0.008 
(0.574) 
 
***, **, * = coefficient is significant at the α=0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
